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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Gerald Kay Umphenour appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession 
of methamphetamine. On appeal, he asserts that he was deprived of his right to waive 
his jury trial and that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
A police officer, recognizing Umphenour, pulled him over on an arrest warrant 
(R., p.13.) Approaching Umphenour's car, the officer saw Umphenour place an open 24 
ounce can of Budweiser beer into a cup holder. (R., pp.13-14.) The officer advised 
Umphenour that there was a warrant for his arrest and that he was placing Umphenour 
under arrest. (R., p.13.) The officer ordered Umphenour to place his hands behind his 
back. (Id.) Umphenour reluctantly complied. (Id.) As the officer held Umphenour's 
hands with one of his own and reached for his handcuffs, Umphenour broke his right 
hand free and began reaching inside of his coat pocket. (Id.) 
Thinking that Umphenour was going for a weapon, the officer shoved him against 
the vehicle and ordered that he place his hands behind his back. (Id.) Umphenour did 
not comply, but instead kept trying to access something in his pocket. (Id.) Fearing for 
his safety, the officer took Umphenour to the ground. (Id.) Several items fell out of 
Umphenour's pockets, including a package of cigarettes. (Id.) The officer cuffed 
Umphenour and secured him in the back of his patrol vehicle. (R., pp.13-14.) The 
officer then retrieved the items, including the cigarette case. (R., p.14.) Opening the 
cigarette case, the officer discovered a baggie of methamphetamine. (Id.) 
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The state charged Umphenour with possession of metharnphetamine, resisting 
and obstructing an officer, and possession of an open container of alcohol. (R., pp.46-
47.) At his arraignment, the district court advised UmphenoUi of his rights, including the 
rights he would give up if he pleaded guilty. (R., pp.48-49.) Umphenour affirmed that 
he understood his rights and what he would give up upon a guilty p!ea. (Id.) Then 
Umphenour informed the court that he was pleading not guilty. (R., p.49.) 
At a later pretrial conference, the parties went on the record so Umphenour's 
attorney could advise the court that the parties had reached an agreement and that 
Umphenour intended to change his plea. (R., p.54.) At the change of plea hearing, the 
parties set forth the terms of Umphenour's plea agreement, including that the state 
would dismiss the two misdemeanor charges. (R., p.56.) The district court aiso advised 
Umphenour that sentencing would not take p!ace for an additional tvvo months and 
asked if he was ready to proceed or if he wanted to speak with his counsel. (Id.) 
Umphenour said that he wanted to take care of it that day. (Id.) 
The district court read the possession of methamphetamine charge and asked 
Umphenour for his plea. (Id.) Umphenour said that he "guessed" he would plead guilty. 
(Id.) The district court informed Umphenour that he could not guess; he had to either 
enter a guilty plea or a not guilty plea. (Id.) Umphenour entered a guilty plea. (R., 
p.57.) He then explained "the circumstances surrounding the event." (Id.) Based on 
this explanation, the district court determined that it could not find a factual basis for 
Umphenour's plea and set a trial date. (Id.) 
On the day of trial, the parties again informed the district court that they had 
reached an agreement. (Tr., p.4, Ls.13-17.) The parties would stipulate to certain facts 
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and the court would make findings based on those facts. (Id.) The district court verified 
that that was the procedure the parties were requesting. (Tr., p.4, L.17.) Umphenour's 
counsel, the prosecutor, and Umphenour himself al! affirmed that that was the 
procedure they were requesting the district court to follow. (Tr., p.4, L.18 - p.5. L.13.) 
Umphenour's counsel explained that they were stipulating that each element of the 
possession of methamphetamine charge was true. (Tr., p.4, L.18 - p.5, L.2.) The court 
ensured that the state also stipulated to those facts (Tr., p.5, Ls.3-5), and then ensured 
that Umphenour personally stipulated to those facts. (Tr., p.5, Ls.6-13.) 
The parties placed the terms of their agreed-upon stipulation on the record, 
which were identical to the terms of Umphenour's earlier plea agreement. (Tr., p.5, L.18 
p.6, L.18.) The district court then verified that the parties wanted the court, based on 
the stipulation, to determine Umphenour's guilt or innocence. (Tr., p.6, Ls.18-22.) Both 
parties affirmed that that is what they wanted. (Tr., p.6, Ls.23-24.) The district court 
determined, based on Umphenour's stipulation to each element of the charged offense, 
that he was guilty of possession of methamphetamine. (Tr., p.6, L.25 - p.7, L.9.) 
The district court entered judgment against Umphenour and sentenced him to a 
unified term of four years with six months fixed. (R., pp.91-92.) Umphenour filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (R., p.94.) While the case was pending on appeal, about nine 
months after judgment was entered, Umphenour filed a motion to commute his 
sentence under Rule 33(d) and a motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Rule 33(c). 
(Augmentation.) The district court denied the motions on the basis that it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the motions. (Id.) 
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ISSUES 
Umphenour states the issues on appeai as: 
1. \/Vas Mr. Umphenour deprived of his constitutional right to a jury 
trial, under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions, when the 
district court he!d a court trial in the absence of any waiver of that right by 
Mr. Umphenour? 
2. Assuming that Mr. Umphenour's court trial on stipulated facts was 
actually a guilty plea, did the district court abuse its discretion when it 
denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea by concluding that it lacked 
jurisdiction to rule on it? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Is Umphenour estopped from challenging on appeal the district court's 
determining his guilt or innocence based on his personal stipulation to each of the 
elements of the charged offense, when that is the procedure he requested below? 
2. Has Umphenour failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his post-judgment motions? 
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ARGUMENT 
L 
Um henour ls Esto ed From Chaiiengin On Appeal The Unorthodox Trial Procedure 
He Requested Below 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Umphenour argues that he was deprived of his right 
to a jury trial when he instead stipulated to each fact of the underlying charge and 
requested that the trial court determine his guilt or innocence. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-
i 0.) Because Umphenour specifically requested this unorthodox procedure, he is now 
estopped from challenging it on direct appeal. Even if he could challenge it on direct 
appeal, Umphenour failed to raise this issue to the district court below and he has failed 
to establish fundamental error entitling him to relief. 
B. Umphenour Is Estooped From Challenging The District Court's Determination Of 
His Guilt Or Innocence. Based On Stipulated Facts, When That Is The Procedure 
He Requested 
"It has long been the law in Idaho that one may not successfully complain of 
errors one has acquiesced in or invited. Errors consented to, acquiesced in, or invited 
are not reversible." State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 379, 313 P.3d 1, 35 (2013) 
(quoting State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 838, 673 P.2d 436, 438 (1983)) (internal 
citations omitted). The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who 
"caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court" to take a particular action 
from "later challenging that decision on appeal." State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 
985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999). 
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The doctrine of invited error squarely applies in this case. On the morning of 
Umphenour's trial, the district court went on the record and expiained that "[c]ounsel 
indicated before we came in that you had discussed this case further, and that there 
was a proposal that the parties stipulate to certain facts, and that the Court make 
findings based upon those facts." (Tr., p.4, Ls.13-17.) The district court verified that 
this was the procedure the parties were requesting. (Tr., p.4, L.17.) Umphenour's 
counsel affirmed that it was, and then went on to explain that he had conferred with 
Umphenour and that Umphenour would stipulate that each element of the charged 
crime was true. (Tr., p.4, L.18 - p.5, L.2.) The district court verified that the state was 
onboard, and the prosecutor affirmed that it was. (Tr., p.5, Ls.3-5.) 
The district court then asked Umphenour personally whether he had discussed 
this procedure with his attorney. (Tr., p.5, Ls.6-7.) Umphenour affirmed that he had. 
(Tr., p.5, L.8.) Then the district court asked Umphenour personally if he was stipulating 
to the truth of each element of the charged offense. (Tr., p.5, Ls.9-12.) Umphenour 
affirmed that he was. (Tr., p.5, L.13.) 
After defense counsel placed the parties' underlying agreement on the record, 
the district court again verified "that both counsel want me to make a finding with 
respect to guilt or innocence based upon the stipulation that's been entered into by both 
parties." (Tr., p.6, Ls.18-22.) Both parth3s agreed that this is what they were requesting 
the court to do. (Tr., p.6, Ls.23-24.) Based on Umphenour's stipulation to each element 
of the crime, the district court determined that Umphenour was guilty of possession of 
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.6, L.25 - p.7, L.9.) 
6 
This is not the standard procedure for resolving a criminal case. But it was the 
procedure Umphenour specifically requested below. He cannot now complain that 
following his requested procedure was error. He is estopped under the doctrine of 
invited error from raising this issue on direct appeai. 
C. Umphenour Has Failed To Show That The Court Committed Fundamental Error 
By Employing The Procedure Requested By The Parties 
Umphenour never objected to his requested procedure below. Generally, issues 
not raised to the district court may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State 
v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Therefore, even if this Court 
concludes that Umphenour's claim does not fail under the invited error doctrine, he 
would still be required to show fundamental error in order to entitle him to review of this 
unpreserved issue. See State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. 
App. 2010) (unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes 
fundamental error"). In order to establish fundamental error, 
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the 
alleged error: ( 1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as 
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,226,245 P.3d 961,978 (2010). Umphenour has not met 
this burden. 
By stipulating to each element of the charged offense and requesting that the 
district court determine his guilt or innocence, Umphenour effectively waived his right to 
a jury trial. Umphenour claims on appeal that the district court committed fundamental 
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error by not ensuring that Umphenour's waiver was personal. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-
10.) But Umphenour has failed to show that his lack of a personal, on the record waiver 
violates a constitutional right. 
In Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008), the United States Supreme 
Court allowed that 
there is support in our cases for concluding that some [fundamental] rights 
cannot be waived absent the defendant's own consent. Whether the 
personal consent must be explicit and on the record or can be determined 
from a course of conduct may be another matter, but for now it suffices to 
note that we have acknowledged that some rights cannot be waived by 
the attorney alone. 
kl at 247-48 (citations omitted). The Court explained that "[f]or certain fundamental 
rights, the defendant must personally make an informed waiver." kl at 248. But the 
Court had only ever required "the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of 
the client" for the waiver to be valid. Id. 
Justice .Scaiia was more explicit in his concurrence in Gonzalez, explaining that 
the Court's "opinions have sometimes said in passing that, under the Constitution, 
certain 'fundamental' or 'basic' rights cannot be waived unless a defendant personally 
participates in the waiver," but in almost each instance it was merely dicta. JsL at 254-55 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988); United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-15 
(2000); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187-88 (2004)). "[E]xcept for one line of 
precedent, no decision of [the Supreme Court of the United States] holds that, as a 
constitutional matter, a defendant must personally waive certain of his 'fundamental' 
rights-which typically are identified as the rights to triai, jury, and counsel. The 
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except:onai line of precedent invo!'1es the right to counsel." Jsi. at 255 (Scalia. J., 
concurring) (citation omitted). Whlle Justice Scalia noted that "it is certainiy prudent" for 
a court to ensure the "defendant's personal consent to certain actions, such as entry of 
a guilty plea or waiver of jury trial," there was "no basis in the Constitution ... for 
distinguishing in this regard between a criminal defendant and his authorized 
representative." ~ at 257 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
At most then, all that is required to meet the constitutional standard for waiver 
under the United States Constitution is the informed consent of the defendant. In this 
case defense counsel informed the court that he had talked with Umphenour and they 
had agreed to stipulate to the truth of each element of the crime, and Umphenour 
acknowledged that he had spoken with his counsel and that he did stipulate to each 
element of the crime. Umphenour has failed to show clearly from the record that he did 
not give his informed consent to the procedure stipulated to by his counsel. 
The Idaho State Constitution is unambiguous in regards to what is required to 
waive a jury trial. It states, "[a] trial by jury may be waived in all criminal cases, by the 
consent of the parties, expressed in open court." Idaho Const. Art. I, § 7. Not only did 
Umphenour acknowledge that he was aware that he was stipulating to each element of 
the crime (Tr., p.5, Ls.6-13), the parties in fact consented, in open court, to the district 
court determining Umphenour's guilt or innocence based on his stipulation. (Tr., p.6, 
Ls.18-24.) That is sufficient to meet the legal standards set forth under the Idaho State 
Constitution. Because the minimal constitutional standards were met in this case, there 
is no fundamental error. 
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On appeai, Umphenour cites to the Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Swan, 
108 Idaho 963, 966, 703 P.2d 727, 730 (Ct App. 1985), where the Court adopted the 
American Bar Association's recommended procedure of directly asking the defendant if 
he waived his right to trial by jury. But Svvan was not decided under a fundamental error 
analysis, nor did the Court announce a constitutional standard. That case is a!so 
distinguishable because the concerns that were noted by the Court in Swan do not 
apply to Umphenour's case. Explaining the importance of the constitutional right to a 
jury trial, the Court relied on the United State Supreme Court's opinion in Patton v. 
United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930), that "the maintenance of the jury as a fact 
finding body in criminal cases is of such importance," that waiver requires the consent of 
all parties (emphasis added). 1 But there is no issue with the jury serving as fact-finder 
in this case, because the parties-including Umphenour personally-stipulated to each 
element of the crime. (Tr., p.4, L.18- p.5, L.13.) 
In addition to Umphenour's claimed error not being constitutional, it is also not 
clear on the record that Umphenour was uninformed of his right to a jury trial or that he 
was unaware that he would be waiving that right by stipulating to each element of the 
crime and requesting that the court determine his guilt or innocence based on that 
stipulation. The opposite may be true. At his arraignment, Umphenour was advised of 
the rights he would give up if he pleaded guilty (which would have include the right to 
trial by jury) and he acknowledged that he understood those rights. (R., p.49.) At a 
1 Moreover, while the Supreme Court in Patton stated that "the express and intelligent 
consent of the defendant" is required for an effective waiver of the right to a jury trial, 
281 U.S. at 312, that requirement was satisfied in that case by counsel's representation 
that he had conferred with his clients and obtained their consent, 281 U.S. at 286-87. 
The Court did not require a personal, on the record waiver by the defendants and in fact 
accepted counsel's representation of his clients' consent. 
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later hearing, Umphenour attempted to enter a guilty piea. (R., pp.56-57.) But the 
district court rejected that plea because. after Umphenour explained the ''circumstances 
surrounding the event" the court couid not find a factual basis for accepting the p!ea. 
(id.) Then, on the day of trial, Umphenour personally stipulated to the truth of each 
element of the crime, providing the missing factual basis. 
The unusual procedure chosen by the parties in this case may have also served 
a tactical purpose. ln exchange for Umphenour's earlier guilty plea, the state had 
agreed to dismiss two additional charges and the district court informed him that 
sentencing would be set two months out. (R., p.56.) For whatever reason, Umphenour 
had a very difficult time entering a guilty plea in this case. Having the district court 
determine Umphenour's guilt or innocence based on the stipulated facts allowed 
Umphenour to reap the benefits of his guilty plea-which included the dismissal of 
lesser charges, getting a later sentencing date, and not being taken into custody (Tr., 
p.5, L.18- p.6, L.18)-without actually having to admit his guilt. 
The right of trial by jury is an important right protected by the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and by Article I, § 7 of the Idaho State Constitution. But it 
is also a right which can be waived. Idaho Const. Art. I, § 7. Umphenour waived his 
right to trial by jury by personally stipulating to each and every element of the crime and 
then, through counsel, requesting that the district court determine his guilt or innocence 
based upon that stipulation. Though such a procedure is unusual, it is the procedure 
Umphenour requested; he cannot now challenge it on direct appeal. And even if he 
could, he has still failed to show that the district court committed fundamental error 
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entitiing him to relief bv g01ng ahead w:th Umphenour's requested procedure. 
Umphenour's conviction should be affirmed. 
j! 
I I. 
Umphenour Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Den in His Post-Jud ment Motions 
A. Introduction 
Nine months after he was convicted for possession of methamphetamine, 
Umphenour filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) or 
to commute his sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 33(d). (Augmentation.) The 
district court denied the motions on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
motions. On appeal, Umphenour confines his argument to the district court's denial of 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Application of the correct legal standards to the 
facts of this case, however, shows no abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free review. State v. 
Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P .3d 1083, 1084 (2003). 
r-
\..,, The District Court Correctly Denied Umphenour's Rule 33(c) ~.fotion 
First, as to the Rule 33(c) motion, the state concedes that a district court may 
rule upon a motion to withdraw the guilty plea until the finality of judgment. State v. 
McAmis, 156 Idaho 55, _, 320 P.3d 446, 447 (Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted). 
Because Umphenour filed an appeal, the judgment is not final in this case. See State v. 
Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003). However, the t:meliness of 
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U~phenour's motion is not the only possible bar to the district court's jurisdiction. 
Umphenour did not technically plead gui!ty. instead. he requested that the district court 
determine his guilt or innocence based on his stipulation to the underlying facts of this 
case. (Tr, p.6, Ls.18-24.) The district court determined, based on the parties' 
stipulation, that Umphenour was guilty. 
Because there was no guilty plea to withdraw, Umphenour has not shown that 
the court had juiisdiction to entertain a motion to withdraw the (non-existent) guilty plea. 
Even if the district court had jurisdiction to rule on Umphenour's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea, it would not have discretion to grant the motion, because there was no guilty 
plea to withdraw. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion it 
lacked discretion to grant. 
In the alternative, even if Umphenour's stipulation to the elements of his crime 
and request that the district court determine his guilt or innocence constituted some sort 
of plea, he has still failed to show that he is entitled to withdraw that plea. While the 
district court would have jurisdiction to consider Umphenour's motion, Umphenour 
would still be required to show manifest injustice to withdraw his guilty plea because the 
motion was filed (several months) after sentencing. I.C.R. 33(c). Nothing in 
Umphenour's motion shows manifest injustice. 
Umphenour claimed that his plea agreement contemplated that he would be 
placed on probation. (Motion, p.6 (Augmentation).) During his change of plea hearing, 
however, the district court asked Umphenour if "anybody promised [him] anything ... as 
far as what would happen if [he] stipulated" to the elements of his crime. (Tr., p.5, 
Ls.14-16.) Umphenour answered, "No." (Tr., p.5, L.17.) Umphenour's attorney clarified 
13 
th2t the ;:.:a1iies had agreed that the state would dismiss a pair of rr.isdemeanors: 
ser.tencing wouid be down the road; Umphenour would not be taken into custody 
immediately: and, while it was an open sentencing, that the defense could argue for an 
interstate compact if Umphenour received probation. (Tr., p.5, L.18 - o.6, L.2.) There 
was no promise that Umphenour would be placed on probation. 
Umphenour's failure to receive the sentence he wanted does not remotely 
demonstrate manifest injustice. Even if Urnphenour's court trial on his stipulation to 
each element of the crime constituted a guilty plea, he would not be entitled to withdraw 
that plea. Though the district court denied the motion on an incorrect basis, this Court 
may still affirm the district court's denial by applying the correct legal standards. State 
v. Row, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001 ). 
D. The District Court Correctly Denied Urnphenour's Rule 33(d) Motion 
Regarding the Rule 33(d) motion, while Rule 33(d) allows a sentencing court to 
commute a sentence, it does not provide for a motion to commute. Compare l.C.R. 
33(c). Rather, in order to request that the district court commute his sentence, like any 
other discretionary sentencing reduction, Umphenour was required to file a Rule 35 
motion. Umphenour was acting pro se when he filed the motion and, because his 
motion is essentially a request for leniency, this Court may construe it as a Rule 35 
motion. But that does not help Umphenour. A Rule 35 motion must be filed within 120 
days of the entry (not fina!ity) of judgment, and that time limit is strictly enforced. State 
v. Parvin, 137 Idaho 783, 785, 53 P .3d 834, 836 (Ct. App. 2002). Umphenour's motion 
was filed well-outside of the 120-day period provided by Rule 35. The district court, 
therefore, did not have jurisdiction to rule on that mobon. ~ 
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The district court correctly denied Umphenour's post-judgment motions. First 
Umphenour technically did not plead guiity, so there was no gui!:y piea for the district 
court to consider allowing Umphenour to withdraw. And even if there was a guilty piea, 
Umphenour failed to show manifest injustice entitling him to withdraw that plea. 
Second. Umphenour's request for commutation of his sentence, which would have been 
proper as a Rule 35 motion, was untimely under Rule 35. The district court's order 
denying Umphenour's motion should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Umphenour's conviction and 
the district court's order denying his post-judgment motions. 
DATED this 25th day of September, 2014. 
~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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